We are assuming that the mind
contains "multiple executive systems with preferential access to
different memories and different action programs" or "modules" for
short. Some of the mind's modules are associated with what we call
"consciousness."
So, something like a tribal-wide-social "consciousness module," a
school-social module, a work-social module, a
sport-enthusiast-social module, neighbor-social module,
family-social module, a no-one-else-around module, and possibly
others depending upon how a person lives.
The modules described above could be extremely simple algorithms
(rules of behavior) with pointers to "tables" (more algorithms)
for the body language, spoken language, dress code, etc. that are
appropriate for the specific social setting. These social modules
are "mutually exclusive" (only one can be "selected" at a time).
Moreover, which module is selected would be determined by a
subconscious "multiplexer" (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiplexer
) that is associated with the processing of environmental cues.
A single self-deceived or
several subselves divided?
Would we lie to ourselves? We don't need to. Rather than a single
self equipped with a few bivariate[1] processes, the mind is
composed of a dissociated aggregation of subselves processing
qualitatively different information relevant to different adaptive
problems. Each subself selectively processes the information
coming in to the brain as well as information previously stored in
the brain.
https://jayhanson.org/_Biology/Kenrick.html
Two problems with
"self-deception": No "self" and no "deception"
While the idea that being wrong can be strategically advantageous
in the context of social strategy is sound, the idea that there is
a "self" to be deceived might not be. The modular view of the mind
finesses this difficulty and is useful – perhaps necessary – for
discussing the phenomena currently grouped under the term "self
deception."
https://jayhanson.org/_Biology/Kurzban.html
Conscious Thought Is for Facilitating
Social and Cultural Interactions: How Mental Simulations
Serve the Animal–Culture Interface
Roy F. Baumeister and E. J. Masicampo
Florida State University
Five empirically based critiques have undermined the standard
assumption that conscious thought is primarily for input
(obtaining information from the natural environment) or output
(the direct control of action). Instead, we propose that conscious
thought is for internal processing, to facilitate downstream
interaction with the social and cultural environment. Human
consciousness enables the construction of meaningful, sequential
thought, as in sentences and narratives, logical reasoning,
counting and quantification, causal understanding, narratives, and
the simulation of events (including nonpresent ones). Conscious
thought sequences resemble short films that the brain makes for
itself, thereby enabling different parts of brain and mind to
share information. The production of conscious thoughts is closely
linked to the production of speech because the human mind evolved
to facilitate social communication and information sharing, as
culture became humankind's biological strategy. The influence of
conscious thought on behavior can be vitally helpful but is mostly
indirect. Conscious simulation processes are useful for
understanding the perspectives of social interaction partners, for
exploring options in complex decisions, for replaying past events
(both literally and counterfactually) so as to learn, and for
facilitating participation in culture in other ways.
https://jayhanson.org/_Biology/consciousness.pdf